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SAMUEL WILLISTON: THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE AND THE
PRIOR LAW OF SALES-SEAMLESS
OR TANGLED WEB
RicHARD D. CUDAHY*
On February 17, 1963, Samuel Williston, whose name and works
run through almost the entire course of modern legal education and
practice of American commercial law, died at Cambridge, Masschusetts,
where he was born in 1861. He was the oldest alumnus of both Har-
vard College (1882) and its Law School (1888). Between college and
law school Williston worked for some time in Newport on a survey
of the Northern Pacific Railroad, where, among other things, he
acquired a considerable skill in billiards (though not, as he noted in
later years, so considerable as to put him in danger of making it a
career) .'
After graduating at the top of his class from Harvard Law School,
he served as secretary to Mr. Justice Gray of the United States Su-
preme Court, was a practicing lawyer in Boston, and taught law for
nearly fifty years at Harvard, taking a major part in the growth and
development of that institution. He played a leading role in systema-
tizing and to a degree, modifying the common law as draftsman of
some of the most important of the Uniform State Laws, particularly
including the Uniform Sales Act, which was first recommended for
enactment in 1906. In the same connection, he served for many years
as the Commissioner from Massachusetts on the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, was the Reporter for the
Restatement of Contracts (1932) and an Advisor on the Restatement
of Restitution.2 He is perhaps best known to practically all of us who
have ever opened a law book as the author of Willirton on Contracts
and Williston on Sales, two works having almost scriptural status
in their fields. His influence, on American commercial law, though
exercised with modesty and restraint and the utmost sense of respon-
sibility, has been pervasive almost beyond belief.
In 1940 Williston published a charming autobiographical work,
Life and Law,3 which was reviewed in the Harvard Law Review by
Austin Whiteman Scott (of Trusts eminence), who was Dane Pro-
fessor of Law as Samuel Williston had been before him.
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3 Ibid.
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Of Williston, Scott wrote:
No one could sit in the classroom under Professor Williston,
as I did thirty-four years ago, without realizing at once that
here was a great teacher. The students were not merely in-
terested; they were roused. There was an intellectual excite-
ment in the atmosphere. This was not due to anything as artificial
as oratory or histrionics on the part of the teacher. No one could
have been more calm and more restrained than he. There was a
feeling, however, of eagerness in the pursuit of ideas, a pursuit
as exciting as a fox hunt. Many of us realized for the first time
the real joy of an intellectual combat.
How did he create this atmosphere? I think that it was by
being himself. His acute mind, his accurate mastery of his ma-
terial, his own keen interest in the matter at hand, his treatment
of the students as equals cooperating in the search for truth, his
great sense of humor, all these played a part in the tri-weekly
drama of the course on Contracts.4
It is, perhaps, ironic that Williston's last published work, published
at his then age of 89 in 1950, was an adverse criticism of Article 2
(The Sales Article) of the Uniform Commercial Code (1949 Draft,
since modified), which Williston saw as a disruptive development in
the conceptual coherence and evolutionary growth of the Law of Sales,
which he had labored so long and fruitfully to further.5 But the
erosive winds of legal realism, coupled with changes in the commercial
realities themselves, had long since begun to weaken the foundations
of the work which the common-law system-builders of 1890-1920 had
striven to construct.6
Williston in the 1950 article said:
Some of these provisions [of Article 2 of the U.C.C.] are
not only iconoclastic but open to criticisms that I regard so
fundamental as to preclude the desirability of enacting this part
at least of the proposed Code. I feel compelled, contrary to my
original expectation, to publish the reasons for my opposition.7
4 Scott, Book Review, 54 HARV. L. REV. 352 (1940).
5 WILLISTON, The Law of Sales in the Proposed Uniform Commercial Code,
63 HARv. L. REv. 561 (1950).
Several revised drafts of the Code have been prepared subsequent to the
1949 Draft (the tentative document reviewed by Williston) and to the cri-
tiques of the New York Revision Commission and many other reviewers and
commentators. Thus, a leading student of the Code writes: "The present
writer, in an article concerning the 1952 'Official Draft,' concluded that 'the
things which are good in this draft are so fine and so many as compared with
the things that are mediocre or downright bad that the Uniform Sales Act
can well be replaced by the Uniform Commercial Code provisions on Sales.'
This latest [1958], and final draft has cured a number of sections from
ambiguities and uncertainties due to awkward draftsmanship and, in some
cases, policy matters were rectified due to intervening criticism." Lattin, The
Uniform Commercial Code, Article 2: Sales, 23 OHIO ST. L. J. 185 (1962).
6 Gilmore, For Wesley Sturges: On the Teaching and Study of Law, 72 YALE
L. J. 646-650 (1963).
7 \illiston, supra, note 5, at 561.
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In an unnecessary, but poignant, footnote to his critique of the Code
(and by references to the "Code" we refer throughout this article only
to Article 2 thereof), he expressly disavowed any financial motivation
for attacking it. Thus, he stated: "I have no pecuniary interest in the
status quo. My treatises on Sales and on Contracts belong wholly to
the publishers. My share in a casebook on Sales belongs now wholly
to the co-editor."
It is certain that financial considerations could not influence Samuel
Williston's judgment of the new work; but his emotional and intellec-
tual investment in the existing fabric of the codified common law, to
which he had contributed so much, with so much distinction, for so
many years, might be another matter.
Williston's fundamental objection to the new Code was that it rep-
resented a seemingly abrupt departure in language and formulation,
and to a lesser degree, in concept and doctrine, from existing statutory
and common law. To him it was not a mark of merit that the Code
spoke unabashedly in a new language. That the Commercial Code more
frequently than not is intended to produce a result identical to that
reached under existing law (or if not, a "better" result), or that the
new language of the Code attempts to embody rules more meaningful
in business practice than the language and concepts abandoned, were
apparently not considerations of sufficient validity or weight to Williston
to justify the deliberate and wholesale departure from the purportedly
integrating and rationalizing formulations of the prior law.
Williston himself favored amendment of the existing uniform
statutes as a device preferable to the promulgation of virgin law. His
objections to a new statute, speaking in significant measure in a
language foreign to the existing law, were stated in part as follows:
Lawyers are well aware that the words of a long statute,
comprehending a large branch of the law, never clearly give the
answers to all possible problems. Years of judicial decisions are
necessary to resolve the problems. Under a statute as long as
the proposed Code, in which many of the rules and most of the
language differ from those in existing statutes, the determination
of countless cases will be necessary to give reasonable certainty
to the law. Precedents cease to have certain application when
words are wholly changed from those in existing statutes. The
question whether principles were also changed is always present,
even though no change in them was intended.
It was such considerations that led me, when the project
was first proposed, to express the belief that amendments and
additions to the existing uniform statute were the proper remedy
to correct any defects in them and to provide for omitted situa-
tions; I did not then imagine a project to restate or to reform
the law so radically as the proposed Code seeks to do. My
8Id. at 561.
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original objection to a new Code seems to me still sound, but
the novelty of the phraseology and the iconoclastic provisions of
the present [1949] draft add force to this objection.9
The most glaring (but not the only) vice which Williston detected
in the Commercial Code was the radical downgrading of the concept
of title from its prior eminence as a pivotal consideration in sales
transactions.
He said:
Certainly many of the most important questions in the law
of property, both real and personal, have always turned on the
requisites for the transfer of title, the moment when the transfer
occurs, and the consequences of transfer. The English Sale of
Goods Act and the American Sales Act, following established
common law rules, make elaborate provisions for answering
these questions.
He warned that the attempt to make title unimportant was un-
satisfactory and could result only in confusion when taken in con-
nection with other laws (e.g. The Bankruptcy Act laws, regulating the
sale of liquor and like goods, conflict of law matters, and problems of
devolution of property and taxation). He feared that the rights of a
good faith purchaser would become confused if divorced from the con-
cept of title.10
He also said:
If it were intended under the novel terminology of the Code
that the rights and duties of seller and buyer should be the same
as under the hitherto accepted terminology which bases rights
and duties on ownership, and makes intention the vital basis
for transfer of title, the wording is so different that much litiga-
tion would be necessary to establish the fact. But the Code ex-
pressly repudiates title as determining the rights and duties of
the parties and seeks to substitute particular rules instead of the
inclusive principle based on intention. The provisions of the Code
apply "irrespective of title." The Code gives no indication of what
is to be done where rights of buyer and seller, under such laws
as I have referred to, vary the rights provided for in the Code.-"
[Emphasis supplied.]
Williston basically disapproved abandonment of the generalization
and inclusiveness seemingly achieved by the codifiers of the common
law in favor of a Code employing a far greater particularization of
rules. He felt that by amputating or emasculating a major central con-
cept such as "title" (no matter how abstruse might be the means of
applying such a concept to particular situations) the new codifiers
might violently disturb the purported balance and integrity provided
by the old formulae. Williston wrote:
9 Id. at 565.
10 Id. at 566-569
11 Id. at 569.
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As Maitland. wrote, the law is a "seamless web." The most
fundamental feature of the law of property (the concept of
title) cannot be made immaterial in a statute on the sale of
goods without tearing the seamless web. This misfit with other
legislation and with the common law seems to me fatal. 2
Williston also pointed out that the advantages of having a close
statutory mesh with the English Sale of Goods Act (which controls a
substantial part of the world's commerce) and of having a helpful
degree of parallelism with the common law would be lost under the
new Code.' 3
Thus, Williston's objections to Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial
Code (though incorporating many specific and detailed criticisms of
form and substance) were generally rooted in a deep respect for the
tested terminological and conceptual scheme. He apparently preferred
the effort of the great treatise-writers and draftsmen of the Uniform
Acts to rationalize, codify and selectively improve the concepts of the
common law to the contrasting method of massively infusing into the
body of the law new language, and to a lesser degree new concepts,
unprocessed by the judicial mill. The Code, on the other hand, takes
the view that if the old language is a dead language, or at best an
archiac one, it is better to substitute the "vernacular" reflecting
commercial practice and formulate it into as many rules as seem
necessary to cover the complex realities of current business. The authors
of the Commercial Code, as Williston so indignanty points out, have
shown little reverence for language honored by legal usage and have
set up a new and judicially "rootless" (though commercially more
pertinent) scheme within which to frame the rules of trade. What
Williston saw as a "seamless web," the Code draftsmen saw as a
"tangled web" better boldly jettisoned where necessary than tinkered
with."4
The debate continues as to whether adoption of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code is in the interest of all those concerned with the com-
mercial law. Clearly, the majority view at this date seems to be that
the Code, in its current form retains all or practically all, that was
substantially important and desirable in the Sales Act and the common
law and that the new Code formulations have been helpful. The Code
has now been adopted (with some modifications) in twenty-three
jurisdictions and has been effective in Pennsylvania for almost nine
12 Id. at 569.
1 Id. at 563-564.
14 See also Corman, The Law of Sales Under the Uniform Colfunercial Code,
17 RuTGERs L. REv. 14 (1962); Corbin, The Uniform Commercial Code-
- 'Sales; Should It Be Enacted, 59 YALE L. J. -821 (1950) ; Rabel, The Sales Law
in the Proposed Conitnercial Code, 17 U. CHi. L. Ray. 427 (1950).
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years.'5 In a recent article a practitioner in Pennsylvania indicated a
considerable degree of satisfaction with the operation of the Code and
particularly with its philosophy toward the concept of title which was
so irksome to Samuel Williston.
Thus the Pennsylvanian writes:
The code minimizes, practically to the vanishing point, the
importance of title as a factor in the solution of sales problems.
* * * Although at first glance the presumptions [as to title] set
forth in the Sales Act seemed to solve everything, when [the
author of the article] endeavored to find out in a particular
transaction between two business men just where the title of
the goods rested at a particular moment, something with which
the business men themselves had been in no way concerned, he
had the greatest difficulty in fixing its location even with the help
of these presumptions. * * * Although he has had little occasion
to face similar actual problems since the Code was adopted, he
has nevertheless made some study of Article 2 [of the U.C.C.],
with the result that he feels far more confident about his ability
to answer them if they should arise than he was ten years ago.
The Code appears to provide specific answers to a large number
of factual situations which commonly arise in sales transactions
and to afford the bar a far greater degree of certainty than was
ever available under the Sales Act.16
So far, at least, no deluge of litigation to confirm the fears of its
critics, has appeared in the jurisdiction where the Code is in effect.
Possibly, it is too early to tell whether the radical approach fre-
quently taken by the Commercial Code in matters of language, formu-
lation, conceptual scheme and other areas will prove to be merely a
clearing away of the disabling undergrowth of the past or whether
'5 Alaska (effective Jan. 1, 1963)
Arkansas (effective Jan. 1, 1962)
Connecticut (effective Oct. 1, 1961)
Georgia (effective April 1, 1963)
Illinois (effective July 2, 1962)
Indiana (no effective date yet set)
Kentucky (effective July 1, 1960)
Maryland (effective Feb. 1, 1964)
Massachusetts (effective Oct. 1, 1958)
Michigan (effective Jan. 1, 1964)
Montana (effective Jan. 1, 1965)
New Hampshire (effective July 1, 1961)
New Jersey (effective Jan. 1, 1963)
New Mexico (effective Jan. 1, 1962)
New York (effective Sept. 27, 1964)
Ohio (effective July 1, 1962)
Oklahoma (effective Jan. 1, 1963)
Oregon (effective Sept. 1, 1963)
Pennsylvania (effective July 1, 1954)
Rhode Island (effective Jan. 2, 1962)
Tennessee (effective June 30, 1964)
West Virginia (no effective date yet set)
Wyoming (effective Jan. 1, 1962)
16 Malcolm and Funk, Pennsylvania and Massachusetts Experience Under the
Uniform Comnmercial Code, 16 Bus. Law. 525, 533 (1961).
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new concepts will produce the disorder in the body of the law antici-
pated thirteen years ago by Williston. So far the Code, changed in
many respects since he reviewed it, seems to have performed remark-
ably well.
In any event, and whatever the outcome, Samuel Williston's almost
unique eminence as a scholar and reformer-systematizer in the fields
of sales and contract law, and as the veritable court of last resort for
a great body of American commercial transactions, can never be com-
promised. For it was he who was pre-eminent in the endeavor to codify,
improve and rationalize the common law, so necessary in the years
when he worked and taught. Even if the statute, which he so vigor-
ously opposed in its then form in 1950, were to be universally adopted,
Williston's methodical and searching legal thought will continue to
speak through the new law as it did through the old.
